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ABSTRACT Postcolonial theorists have criticized the Frankfurt School for its reliance on 
forms of utopian thinking that build on teleological philosophies of history and 
Eurocentric narratives of progress. Although I am sympathetic to these concerns – voiced 
most powerfully by Amy Allen in The End of Progress (2016) – I contend that they 
overlook the extent to which the thinkers of the Frankfurt School theorize the past 
through the paradigm of collective memory, not stadial philosophies of history. This is 
true not only of the first generation of critical theory, but also of Jürgen Habermas, a 
frequent target of postcolonial critique. I argue that his recent work treats the past through 
the paradigm of collective memory as a fallible record of mistakes that should motivate 
social learning. Although Habermas and the Frankfurt School need to do more to extend 
these insights beyond Europe, their work contains the insights necessary to take this step. 
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Methodology has become an increasingly salient issue within political theory in 
recent years. In contrast to politics and philosophy, which have long histories of 
epistemological disputes regarding proper research practices and procedures, “Political 
theorists are often silent on questions of method and approach” (Leopold & Stears, 2008, 
p. 1). This newfound attention to these issues has had a particularly large effect on the 
work of the thinkers associated with Institute for Social Research (Institut für 
Sozialforschung) in Frankfurt given critical theory’s long-standing desire to differentiate 
itself from “traditional theory” (Horkheimer, 1972) by developing an interdisciplinary 
methodology “guided by a practical, emancipatory interest” (Fraser, 2007, p. 322).
3
 
The Frankfurt School seeks to achieve this goal through a synthesis of descriptive 
(empirical) research and proscriptive (normative) advocacy. The result is a methodology 
that proceeds in two operative stages. In what Seyla Benhabib (1986, p. 226) refers to as 
the “explanatory-diagnostic” moment, the critic seeks to understand and explain the 
underlying social and political pathologies of the present “on the basis of the most precise 
scientific methods” (Horkheimer, 1993, p. 9). With this foundation in place, the second 
                                                
3
 Critical theory and the Frankfurt School are both contested terms. In this paper, I adopt 
a narrower usage of critical theory to refer to the work of the thinkers associated with the 
Institute and their contemporary followers in Germany (e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Axel 
Honneth and Rainer Forst) and the United States (such as Thomas McCarthy, Seyla 
Benhabib and Nancy Fraser, as well as Amy Allen, albeit in a somewhat more critical 
vein). Known collectively as the Frankfurt School, this tradition is rooted in the writings 
of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Friedrich Pollock, Herbert Marcuse, Walter 
Benjamin and the other scholars whose works were collected in the Institute’s house 




“anticipatory-utopian” phase leads the critic to chart paths for future emancipation from 
the pathologies identified by the preceding crisis diagnosis. 
Despite the fact that the Frankfurt School can be treated as a unified tradition 
largely as a result of this shared methodological approach (see Löwenthal, 1980, pp. 77-
79), there is little agreement on the details, especially regarding the second stage of 
critique (Kompridis, 2014, p. 2). While critical theory’s commitment to utopian thinking 
is one of its key characteristics, many postcolonial thinkers have argued that its reliance 
on idealized visions of the future reproduce existing forms of domination based the 
Eurocentric narratives of progress (for example, see Chakrabarty, 2000; Chrostowska & 
Ingram, 2016). Most notably, Edward Said (1993, p. 278) laments the Frankfurt School’s 
“blithe universalism,” noting that “critical theory, despite its seminal insights into the 
relationships between domination, modern society, and the opportunities for redemption 
through art as critique, is stunningly silent on racist theory, anti-imperialist resistance, 
and oppositional practice in the empire.”  
Said’s critique of the Frankfurt School is part of a broader encounter between 
European philosophy and postcolonial studies (Pitts, 2010; Chakrabarty, 2000; Persram, 
2007). The strongest, most coherent statement of these concerns from within the 
Frankfurt School comes from Amy Allen. Building and expanding on Said’s critique, she 
argues, “The problem, as I see it, arises from the particular role that ideas of historical 
progress, development, social evolution, and sociocultural learning play in justifying and 
grounding the normative perspective of critical theorists” (Allen, 2016, p. 3).  
These worries lead Allen to look beyond the canon of the Frankfurt School for an 
alternate, broader conception of critical theory that relies on neither utopian visions of the 
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future nor Eurocentric notions of historical progress. Drawing inspiration from Theodor 
Adorno and Michel Foucault, she develops a form of social criticism that “defines 
emancipation negatively as the transformation of a state of domination into a mobile, 
reversible field of power relations…that does not rest on a positive vision of a power-free 
utopia” (Allen, 2015, p. 515). Although Allen critiques critical theory as a whole, she 
focuses more specifically on three of its most prominent exponents from the second and 
third generations of the Frankfurt School, namely Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, and 
Rainer Forst.  
While I am sympathetic to her concerns, I argue that Allen’s critique overlooks the 
extent to which Habermas has replaced teleological philosophies of history with a focus 
on the traumas preserved within collective memory. On my reading, Habermas – as well 
as much of postwar critical theory – has abandoned historical narratives of progress as a 
result of the European experience of two World Wars, the Great Depression, the rise of 
totalitarianism, and the atrocities of the Holocaust. I will not be able to defend my 
broader claim about the Frankfurt School here. Instead, I focus on Habermas as one 
example of how “the depth of their reckoning with the European legacy makes these 
thinkers indisputable interlocutors even for those who want to ‘provincialize Europe,’ in 
Dipesh Chakrabarty’s famous phrase” (Benhabib, 2018, xvi). Insodoing I argue that 
Habermas’s theory of memory is actually commensurate with the “negativism” and the 
critique of progress that Allen locates in the work of Adorno and Foucault.  
Although Allen has placed an important challenge on the table, my position is that 
her argument is both insufficiently nuanced, in the sense that she does not pay attention to 
the increasingly important role that memory plays in postwar critical theory, and 
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misapplied in the case of Habermas. My basic thesis is that Habermas has developed a 
constructive understanding of remembrance that can act as a non-progressive, open 
resource for utopian thinking in the aftermath of historical ruptures. As a result of his 
personal experience of Europe’s age of total war, Habermas agrees with Adorno that the 
events that occurred between 1914 and 1945 have – in Seyla Benhabib’s (2003, p. 91) 
words – “created a ‘gap’ between past and future of such magnitude that the past…can no 
longer be told as a unified narrative.” This rupture, which is preserved in collective 
memories across the European continent, thus presents an opportunity to create new, non-
progressive narratives about the past that opens up possibilities for social innovation (see 
Verovšek, 2020). In this way Herbert Marcuse argues that “[t]he recherche du temps 
perdu becomes a vehicle of future liberation” (1955, p. 24). 
Given Allen’s claims regarding her desire to “decolonize critical theory,” it is 
surprising that she does not draw on any non-European voices to buttress her argument. 
While this omission is problematic, I do not seek to correct it here. Instead, I devote my 
attention to Jürgen Habermas as a concrete example of the role that memory and learning 
from the past play within contemporary critical theory. Although I agree with Allen that 
Habermas’s work in the 1970s built on a problematic evolutionary philosophy of history, 
I argue that in his recent work he has abandoned this position in favor of an 
understanding of the past that stresses collective memory and rupture as a way of learning 
from past mistakes without having to rely on progressive historical narratives. 
In contrast to Allen, who stresses Habermas’s early sociological theory, my reading 
is based primarily (though not exclusively) on the work that has emerged from his post-
1990 political turn as well as his frequent interventions in the public sphere in his kleine 
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politische Schriften (“short political writings”). I argue over the past three decades he has 
increasingly moved away from a reliance on Eurocentric readings of history to justify his 
belief in progress. Instead, I contend that he has come to treat the past – particularly 
World War II – as a record of mistakes that can motivate social transformation. While I 
agree with Allen that Habermas (and the Frankfurt School as a whole) does indeed focus 
too much on Europe and the Holocaust and too little on the important issues of race, 
colonialism and empire highlighted by postcolonial theorists (see also Verovšek, 
Forthcoming), I contend that this oversight can be corrected by expanding the application 
of this critical theory of memory to include a more active engagement with Europe’s 
history of imperial domination across the globe. 
The body of the argument is divided into three parts. I start by summarizing Allen’s 
critique of the Frankfurt School (I). I then develop my understanding of collective 
memory as a non-progressive resource for utopian thinking in the aftermath of historical 
ruptures by building on the work of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin 
and Herbert Marcuse (II). Lastly, I turn my attention to the crucial role remembrance 
plays in Habermas’s political theory (III). Although he wants to maintain the possibility 
of social learning, I argue that Habermas’s understanding of the past is firmly rooted in 
the paradigm of collective memory, not in stadial philosophies of history. I conclude by 
reflecting on the implications of this argument for the Frankfurt School’s relation to 
postcolonial thought, as well as how critical theory’s desire for “emancipation from 
slavery” (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 246) can continue to build on the concepts of progress 
and utopia while remaining sensitive to Allen’s concerns (IV). 
 
I. Critical Theory and Non-Utopian Emancipation 
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In The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical 
Theory Allen presents a deep critique of the leading thinkers of the second and third 
generations of the Frankfurt School. Despite the differences between Jürgen Habermas, 
Axel Honneth, and Rainer Forst – the three main targets of her analysis – she (Allen, 
2016, p. 32) argues that their philosophies are unified the fact that “claims to broad-based 
historical learning and sociocultural development serve to underwrite the normative 
perspective of certain approaches to critical theory.” In her view their reliance on such 
“backward-looking” conceptions of “progress as a ‘fact’” is worrisome because this 
Eurocentric perspective is used to motivate critical theory’s utopian faith in a better 
future (ibid., p. 11). 
Allen problematizes this relationship by arguing that the idea of progress is bound 
up in with European legacy of global domination. Genealogically speaking, she is right to 
make this connection. After all, Immanuel Kant not only coined the concept of progress 
in the eighteenth century, but did so at the height of European imperialism while “also 
develop[ing] what is arguably the most systematic theory of race and racial hierarchy” 
(McCarthy, 2009, p. 26). Etymologically, the most faithful translation of Fortschritt, the 
German word usually rendered as progress, is “a step forward” or “a move beyond.” The 
notion of progress is thus intimately bound up with the idea of a developmental ladder, 
“conjur[ing] the ghosts of stadial theories of history” (Vázquez-Arroyo, 2008, p. 451). 
The European encounter with the supposedly “inferior,” “primitive” peoples in the 
colonies contributed to the acceptance of the concept of progress and its political 
implications, including the infamous idea of the “white man’s burden.” Intellectually, the 
idea of progress is intimately connected to the philosophies of history produced during 
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the Enlightenment by Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, and Karl Marx. These reflections led to the 
development of modernization theory in the twentieth century, which was inspired by the 
historical sociology of Max Weber. Allen (2016, 25) argues that the Frankfurt School’s 
intellectual debt to Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Weber “expose[s] the normative perspective 
of critical theory as Eurocentric at best and, at worst, as obscuring the racialized aspects 
of European modernity and thereby reinforcing them.” 
Allen’s analysis applies to Habermas, Honneth, and Forst in different ways. I will 
examine her claims about Habermas in greater detail below (see III). For now, it suffices 
to point out that Allen (2016, p. 3) groups Habermas and Honneth together as 
representatives of neo-Hegelian reconstruction, as they both “are committed to the 
thought that critical theory needs to defend some idea of historical progress in order to 
ground its distinctive approach to normativity and, thus, in order to be truly critical.” 
Although their philosophies of history are not as overtly racist as Hegel’s claims 
regarding the developmental primacy of the Germanic world over the Greek, the Roman 
and the Oriental, Allen notes that Habermas and Honneth both argue that contemporary 
practices are the result of a cumulative, potentially progressive learning-process. In line 
with much of postcolonial theory (see Young, 1990), Allen worries that “a certain 
vestigial remnant of the traditional philosophy of history remains in…the notions of 
sociocultural development, historical learning, and moral-political progress that inform 
Habermas’s and Honneth’s conceptions of modernity” (2016, p. 9). 
Allen’s critique of Forst’s argument is somewhat different. Instead of drawing on a 
neo-Hegelian account of historical learning, Forst adopts a neo-Kantian strategy based on 
an autonomous account of practical reason. This approach does not rely on any 
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backward-looking notion of progress “as a fact.” It raises other concerns instead. By 
building a single, universal conception of practical reason based on the European 
experience of Enlightenment, Allen follows James Tully (2008, pp. 148-9) in suggesting 
that this approach “cannot recognize and respect any other of the plurality of narratives, 
traditions or civilizations as equal yet different, and enter into a dialogue with them on 
equal footing.” 
While Allen shares this worry about the imperialism of the kinds of historical 
metanarratives Forst deploys, her concerns about this neo-Kantian approach to critical 
theory go even deeper. She argues that Forst’s grounding of normativity in an abstract, 
noumenal space of reasons that is purportedly free of all power relations blinds him to 
“the role that power plays in constituting the space of reasons in the first place” (Allen, 
2016, p. 149). Thus, in addition to reproducing an inherently Western account of reason, 
she contends that Forst also “adopt[s] a kind of political philosophy as applied ethics 
approach that sacrifices the methodological distinctiveness of critical theory” (Allen, 
2016, p. 15). 
In order to rescue critical theory from these pitfalls, Allen turns to Adorno and 
Foucault. Given Adorno’s skepticism regarding the possibility of progress – which is 
rooted in his personal experience of war and exile during the early twentieth century – as 
well as his pivotal role in the foundation of the critical theory tradition, he is a natural 
point of reference for a negativistic, non-progressive form of emancipatory criticism. 
Writing the aftermath of World War II, Adorno (2006, p. 143) observes that “progress 
today really does mean simply the prevention and avoidance of total catastrophe. And I 
would say that, if only it can be prevented and avoided, that would be in fact progress.” 
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Although Adorno’s skepticism is biographically motivated by the symbolic image 
of Auschwitz, it is philosophically grounded in an immanent critique of Fortschritt. 
However, instead of rejecting progress tout court, Adorno explores the internal 
conceptual tensions within this concept. In Negative Dialectics he writes, 
Universal history must be construed and denied. After the catastrophes that 
have happened, and in view of the catastrophes to come, it would be cynical 
to say that a plan for a better world is manifested in history and unites it. 
Not to be denied for that reason, however, is the unity that cements the 
discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and phases of history – the 
unity of the control of nature, progressing to rule over men’s inner nature 
(Adorno, 1981, p. 320). 
 
What Adorno finds objectionable in this philosophy of history is not its attempt to 
grasp the meaning of the past conceptually; instead, he rejects Hegel’s desire to reconcile 
these events by giving them a teleological, rational purpose. In the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno criticize Hegel again along similar lines, noting 
that “by finally postulating the known result of the whole process of negation, totality in 
the system and in history, as the absolute, he violated the prohibition and himself 
succumbed to mythology” (2002, p. 18). The fact that Hegel posited a closed end of 
history is what makes the Enlightenment “totalitarian as only a system can be.” 
The concerns of postcolonial thinkers regarding Hegel’s philosophy of history are 
driven by the realization that “its intent is that of a progressive teleology that traces the 
development of Geist and the realization of the idea of freedom in the European 
consciousness” (Vázquez-Arroyo, 2008, p. 454). Allen draws on Adorno to argue for 
negativistic notion of emancipation as the reduction of domination: “Central to Adorno’s 
dialectical conception of progress is the idea that the belief in progress as a historical 
‘fact’ – the idea that humanity has progressed in the past and that our present form of life 
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is the result of such progress – stands in the way of progress as a forward-looking moral-
political imperative” (2016, p. 174). In other words, the claim is that the idea of historical 
progress stands in the way of the “anticipatory-utopian” task of critical theory. 
In addition to questioning the role that progress can play in emancipatory criticism, 
Allen also expresses a deep skepticism regarding the Frankfurt School’s methodological 
commitment to utopian thinking. She is concerned that “any and all visions of the good 
life on which emancipatory or anticipatory-utopian hopes may come to rest can be 
unmasked as dangerous illusions or even as tools of oppression and subordination 
themselves” (Allen, 2015, p. 514). This second, more substantive critique is inspired by 
Foucault’s work on power. Although she acknowledges Foucault as an outsider in the 
tradition of critical theory, Allen (2016, p. 164) tries to integrate him into the Frankfurt 
School by arguing that he is Adorno’s “other son.” This move jives with Foucault’s own 
observation that “the Frankfurt people had tried ahead of time to assert things I too had 
been working for years to sustain” (1991, p. 117). 
Foucault’s critique of power questions utopian thinking in two ways. First, his 
analysis of socialization shows that there is no “outside” of power. Instead of being “a 
sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom or some multiple, inert matter to which 
power is applied, or which is struck by a power that subordinates or destroys,” Foucault 
(2003, pp. 29-30) contends that identity construction is always already the result of a 
preexisting “power-effect.” As a result, he argues that the goal of critique cannot be a 
utopia free of power relations. The best we can therefore hope for is liberation from 
existing states of domination where “an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a 
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field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of 
movement” (Foucault, 1997, p. 283). 
From a Foucaultian perspective, the inevitability of power relations makes utopian 
thinking inherently dangerous, since it builds on a “romantic ideal of freedom as 
autonomy” (Koopman, 2013, p. 172). In the second step, Foucault therefore conceives of 
liberation through an appeal to heterotopias, i.e. to sites of resistance where calcified 
states of domination can be “represented, contested, and inverted” (Foucault, 1986, p. 
24). His genealogical approach breaks historical narratives “by following lines of 
fragility…which open up the space of freedom understood as a space of concrete 
freedom, that is of possible transformation” (1994, p. 127). 
The vision of liberation that emerges from Foucault’s work is narrower than that 
offered by the Frankfurt School’s “anticipatory-utopian” form of social criticism. 
However, Allen agues that it both more realistic, because it does not make overly 
idealistic assumptions about the possibility of “socialization without repression” 
(Habermas), and more radical, since it does not link visions of the future to the past in 
the way that progressive philosophies of history are required to do. This model therefore 
offers a negative vision of emancipation in two different senses: “[1] it takes its 
normative bearings from the negative goal of transforming states of domination into 
mobile and reversible fields of power relations; and thus [2] it refrains from positing a 
concrete vision of a power-free utopia.” As a result, Allen (2015, p. 525) argues, 
“Foucault preserves the anticipatory-utopian moment of critique but without falling into 
the trap of being too utopian or not utopian enough.” 
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This model offers an interesting reinterpretation of the “anticipatory-utopian” 
moment of critique by drawing on resources from outside the canon of the Frankfurt 
School. Foucault’s less ambitious form of utopianism is appealing in many ways. 
However, the problem with Allen’s critique – as I see it – regards the relationship she 
posits between the past and social criticism. Although Allen seeks to develop a form of 
social criticism that decouples “backward-looking” conceptions from “forward-looking” 
imperatives, it is not clear that this is possible. After all, while Adorno and Foucault both 
reject what Allen calls “historical progress,” they still rely on “progress in history,” 
which Allen argues should be understood as “a specific domain as judged by standards 
that are themselves historically and contextually grounded” (Allen, 2016, p. 32).
4
 As a 
result, the question is not so much about whether progress is forward- or backward-
looking, but about how social criticism relates to the past (in terms of broad, universal 
meta-narratives or narrower, domain-specific standards rooted in immanent critique). 
For example, even though Adorno criticizes universal philosophies of history, 
Antonio y Vázquez-Arroyo (2008, pp. 455, 461) argues that he also draws on “the critical 
significance of universal history as a narrative category” in order to gain a “more 
adequate understanding of both its utopian content and its historical complicity with 
domination.” Similarly, both the critical impulses and the resources for the “newly 
thinkable” power relations Foucault theorizes come from his genealogical investigations 
into past states of domination. In other words, despite their supposed rejection of history 
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 In this sense, both Adorno and Foucault still build on what Reinhart Koselleck “spaces 
of experience” rooted in the past to drive their future “horizons of expectation.” See 
Koselleck, 1985. 
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as a critical measuring stick against which the present can be evaluated, both Adorno and 
Foucault actually end up drawing on the past for precisely this purpose.  
These observations do not mean that Adorno and Foucault use history in the same 
Eurocentric and teleological ways that Hegel does. They do not. However, although 
Allen has placed her finger on an important problem, I do not think that Habermas’s use 
of the past (or that of many other critical theorists, for that matter) is backward-looking in 
the problematic, universal sense that Allen criticizes. While I agree with Allen in 
rejecting teleological philosophies of history, I argue that backward-looking narratives 
based in collective memory can avoid the problems of “historical progress” while 
maintaining the benefits of thinking through “progress in history.” Although I can only 
demonstrate this difference in reference to what I see as Allen’s misreading of 
Habermas’s mature theory, my comments on Habermas apply to much of the work in 
contemporary critical theory as well.  
In the next section (II), I argue that the key is the shift away from comprehensive 
philosophies of history to the paradigm of collective remembrance. More specifically, I 
contend that the conception of memory developed by the theorists of the first generation 
of the Frankfurt School already contains many of the insights Allen seeks to retrieve from 
Foucault. I then turn to Habermas (III). My basic thesis is that insofar as Habermas does 
rely on the past to motivate his social and political thought, he does so through the lens of 
collective memory, not of neo-Hegelian, Eurocentric philosophies of history. Reading 
Habermas’s recent work in this way brings him closer to Adorno and Foucault than Allen 
and other postcolonial critics realize. While this does not vindicate Habermas’s lack of 
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focus on issues of race, empire and colonialism, it demonstrates that his approach to 
critical theory does have the ability to deal with them. 
 
II. Memory and the First Generation of the Frankfurt School 
Drawing on the path-breaking work of Maurice Halbwachs, in the postwar period 
scholars have increasingly come to recognize the importance of collective remembrance. 
This realization has led to a “memory boom” (Blight, 2009) that extends across the 
humanities and the social sciences. In Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (1925), 
Halbwachs argues that identities is not only socially rediscovered (retrouvée), but also 
socially reconstructed (reconstruite) by individuals within society. The social frameworks 
of mémoire collective not only give meaning to individual remembrance; they also 
influence contemporary events by shaping the historic imaginaries and analogies through 
which individuals and communities understand the present.
5
 
While collective memory is crucial for creating frameworks of reference, it can also 
turn history into a Weberian “iron cage” by locking events into unbreakable chains of 
cause-and-effect. During normal politics communal life is defined by stasis. Established 
interests, institutions, habits and traditions make change difficult to achieve. Public 
understandings of the past play a stabilizing, conservative role as part of what Adorno 
(1966, p. 63) calls “unconscious memory” (unbewußte Erinnerung). It is precisely this 
teleological, determinative understanding of history that Horkheimer and Adorno 
emphasize in their critique of Hegel. 
                                                
5
 Although he was not directly associated with the Frankfurt School, Halbwachs 
collaborated closely with members of the first generation. He even helped to reestablish 
the Institute in Geneva as the Societé Internationale de Recherches Sociales (the 
International Society of Social Research) and supported its Paris branch after it had to 
leave Germany in 1933. He later also intervened to have Walter Benjamin released from 
the concentration camp at Nevers in 1940. See Jay, 1973, pp. 39, 197-8. 
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In the aftermath of Europe’s age of total war, the thinkers of the first generation of 
the Frankfurt School were concerned about the potential of memory to lead to the 
repetition of past mistakes by driving individuals to repeat “cycles of hatred” (Minow, 
2002). However, they also recognized it as an important resource for new thinking. 
Summing up this paradox, Adorno observes, “No timely tradition exists to be summoned, 
but if all tradition is lost, then the march into inhumanity begins” (Adorno, 1998, p.314). 
In order to resolve this dilemma, the theorists of the first generation of the Frankfurt 
School developed a constructive conception of memory as resource for societal 
transformation (see Verovšek, 2020). While memory can reduce the autonomy of 
individuals and communities in the present, Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, and 
Marcuse all seek to deploy it as a constructive resource for social transformation (König, 
2008, p. 165-9). Following Adorno (1998, p. 318), they argue for an active “working 
through of history” (Geschichtsaufarbeitung) that is achieved by maintaining “a critical 
relationship towards tradition as the medium of its preservation.” 
Within individual life histories and communal narratives of the past not all events 
are given equal weight. Unlike the linear understandings of time that undergird 
philosophies of history, memory endows certain events with particular and repeated 
meaning while silencing or forgetting others. Benjamin therefore distinguishes “everyday 
events” (Erlebnisse) from “authentic experiences” (Erfahrungen). Whereas Erlebnisse 
are the building blocks of quotidian life, he argues that Erfahrungen transform those who 
experience them. Unlike events, such experiences allow individuals to link their 
experiences of the past to their visions of the future. For Benjamin, Erfahrung “is less the 
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product of facts firmly anchored in memory than of a convergence in memory of 
accumulated and frequently unconscious data” (1977a, p. 159). 
The desire to break the narrative bonds of tradition while maintaining the ability to 
learn from experiences led the Frankfurt School to develop the concept of a historical 
break or rupture (Bruch). In his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (1940), Benjamin 
(1977b) argues that such ruptures shatter existing narratives and delegitimize progressive 
philosophies of history, allowing individuals to “wrest tradition away from a conformism 
that is about to overpower it” (Thesis IV). Given their violent nature, such experiences 
make “the continuum of history explode” (Thesis XV). Despite their traumatic quality, 
these Erfahrungen are important because they free individuals from established 
understandings, allowing them to engage in new thinking by reconstructing the past in 
new ways. 
This understanding of memory as a resource for what Allen calls the “newly 
thinkable” is decidedly non-progressive. On the contrary, it seeks revolutionary moments 
that turn back “[t]he storm…we call progress” (Thesis IX). Benjamin’s reflections are 
echoed in Daniel Diner’s (1988) concept of “civilizational breaks” (Zivilizationsbrüche), 
which are harrowing events that fundamentally challenge communal understandings of 
the past. 
None of the thinkers of the Frankfurt Circle developed a fully-fledged “theory of 
storms” (Pensky, 2010) based on Benjamin’s fragmentary reflections on the philosophy 
of history. However, like Benjamin, Horkheimer (1970) also reflects on the importance 
of memory in the aftermath of societal ruptures. In his late work he links memory to the 
ability to yearn for the “wholly other” (das ganz Andere). Horkheimer conceives of this 
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as a process of rediscovery, where events are reinterpreted and given meaning within new 
narratives linking the past to the future. 
Marcuse also deals extensively with the past. As he explained in 1937, “Critical 
theory has engaged with the past in such unheard of dimensions precisely because it cares 
about the future” (Marcuse, 1937, p. 126). By allowing individuals and communities to 
reimagine the relationship between the past and the future, memory serves as a critical 
resource for social transformation. Marcuse (1955, p. 24) argues that this temporal 
perspective is important because “the restoration of memory goes hand in hand with the 
restoration of the cognitive content of the imagination [Phantasie].” Imagination enables 
new thinking through the rediscovery and reevaluation of past experiences. However, it is 
also important because the “rediscovered past supplies the critical criteria” (ibid) that can 
be applied to drive change in the present. 
Memory allows individuals to think beyond the limits imposed by existing 
institutions and forms of life. It is a form of utopian thinking precisely because it is not 
bound by the present, but exists in a creative temporal “nowhere.” Marcuse concludes,  
Remembrance of the past may give rise to dangerous insights, and the 
established society seems to be apprehensive of the subversive contents of 
memory. Remembrance is a mode of dissociation from the given facts, a 
mode of ‘mediation’ which breaks, for short moments, the omnipresent 
power of the given facts (1964, pp. 101-2). 
 
My admittedly brief reconstruction of the importance of collective remembrance 
that emerges from the postwar reflections of the Frankfurt Circle demonstrates that this 
tradition already contains the theoretical resources necessary to create a critical, non-
progressive notion of emancipation. I argue that this “critical theory of memory” is not 
unlike the genealogies that Allen seeks in Foucault. Indeed, unlike progressive 
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philosophies of history, it is driven by the experience of catastrophe. Instead of assuming 
“a positive vision of a power-free utopia,” it shows how existing forms of domination 
(Beherrschung in Horkheimer and Adorno’s terms) can be transformed into “a mobile, 
reversible field of power relations” by breaking apart the seeming inevitability of existing 
historical narratives. 
In the next section (III) I therefore turn to the work of Habermas, arguing that 
Adorno’s other, “other son” – it was, after all, Adorno who brought Habermas into the 
Institute and supported his work in the face of Horkheimer’s opposition in the 1960s – 
has an understanding of collective memory that is actually quite closer to that of his 
mentor. Although Habermas does seem endorse a theory of “straight time” committed to 
a progressive account of history in some of his early writings, I argue that collective 
memory and learning from catastrophe has come to play a crucial role in his recent work. 
In making this claim, I focus on his post-1990 political theory and the “short political 
writings” he has produced over the course of his career. 
 
III. Memory in Habermas’s Political Theory 
As the leader of the second generation of the Frankfurt School, Habermas’s 
philosophical project is defined by his attempt to save critical theory from “the 
pessimistic cul de sac in which Horkheimer and Adorno found themselves” after the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (Calhoun, 1992, p. 5). Habermas (1987b, p. 227) has sought 
to achieve this goal by arguing that “freedom from repression, the goal of all revolutions 
since the eighteenth century, will remain a chimera as long as political will-formation is 
not based on the principle of popular discussion without domination.” However, his 
strategy for grounding this communicative ideal has varied over time. 
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In his first book, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1964), he 
sought to root his discourse theory in the eighteenth century bourgeois publicity 
(Öffentlichkeit) created in the salons of France, the German Tischgesellschaften (table 
societies) and English coffeehouses. Habermas argues that these spaces, which were 
located between the private sphere of economic production and the sphere of public 
authority represented by the state, gave birth to a “concept of the humanity that was 
supposed to inhere in humankind as such and truly to constitute its absoluteness” 
(Habermas, 1989b, p. 47) beyond the boundaries of class, profession or religion. 
Although this ideal of free discussion about affairs of public interest was later betrayed 
by a broader “structural transformation,” whereby state institutions replaced reasoned 
discussion with the “manipulative publicity” of modern public opinion, he argues that 
this historical model can serve as a regulative ideal for critical theory. 
In his later work, Habermas has turned away from this historical (one might even 
say genealogical) account of normativity. In his middle and late periods, Habermas’s 
strategy has oscillated between two poles. The first is a neo-Hegelian approach rooted in 
the stages of childhood development identified by Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, 
which he then applies to society as a whole. By contrast, the second seeks to ground 
normativity in the underlying nature of linguistic communication, which is obliged to 
recognize “the unforced force of the better argument.”  
In her critique of Habermas, Allen focuses on the former, i.e. on the evolutionary 
grounding Habermas used to justify communicative rationality in the 1970s. I agree with 
Allen that this approach is problematic for precisely the reasons she identifies. However, 
although both strategies are still present in The Theory of Communicative Action (1981), 
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Habermas (1987a, p. 314) has increasingly comes to favor the latter, that is, the 
universalistic approach justified “in terms of the capacity of responsible participants in 
interaction to orient themselves in relation to validity claims geared to intersubjective 
recognition.” 
In grounding normativity in this way, Habermas (1990a, p. 197) is self-consciously 
sensitive to Allen’s concerns, noting that this approach compels him to “prove that my 
moral principle is not just a reflection of the prejudices of adult, white, well-educated, 
Western males.” Far from accepting the Eurocentric notions of development that emerged 
from the Enlightenment, he rejects the modernization thesis, noting, “Viewed in terms of 
world history, Max Weber’s ‘Occidental Rationalism’ now appears to be the actual 
deviation” (Habermas, 2008a, p. 116). Habermas (2001c) has also moved away from 
Kohlberg’s terminology of “conventional” and “postconventional” identities, increasingly 
speaking in the political language of “national” and “postnational” forms of 
identification. Whereas the former categories are clearly developmental, the latter refer to 
historically contingent categories of political belonging (it is, after all, impossible ex vi 
termini to have a national or even a postnational identity before the development of the 
nation). 
Habermas’s recent strategy for grounding critical theory has thus increasingly come 
to rely on a transcendental claim about the nature of communication itself. Building on 
the insights of the analytic philosophy of language – as well as Martin Buber’s distinction 
between I-It (Ich-Es) and I-Thou (Ich-Du) relationships – Habermas argues that an 
orientation to “mutual understanding” (Verständigung) is imbedded within 
communicative practice. He holds that “[a]s soon as we start communicating, we 
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implicitly declare our desire to reach an understanding with one another about 
something” (Habermas, 2001a, p. 93). This move allows him to get his discourse theory 
off the ground without relying on any “backward-looking” meta-narratives of historical 
progress.  
This position also allows him to “validat[e] freedom’s normative status for 
emancipatory political theory” (Roberts, 2017, p. 749) in a universalistic way based on 
the individual’s “real interest in being free from domination” – i.e. the freedom to 
disagree and literally “be heard” within the practices that sustain subjugation. While 
Habermas tends to draw on European examples, his recent emphasis on “no-saying” 
(White & Farr, 2012) – i.e., on the ability of repressed communities and individuals to 
speak against dominant narratives that “look ‘obvious’ far beyond the ground where they 
have originated” (Chakrabarty, 2002, p. 43) – does potentially allow for universalistic 
narratives to be questioned “from below.” Despite its role in justifying colonialism 
(which he acknowledges), Habermas thus seeks to preserve the critical potential of the 
Enlightenment as an emancipatory project while also allowing it to be questioned from 
the margins. In this sense, his position is not unlike that of Dipesh Chakrabrarty, who 
wants to simultaneously “provincialize” universalistic European humanism while also 
acknowledging the fact that it is “indispensable” insofar as it “has historically provided a 
strong foundation on which to erect – both in Europe and outside – critiques of socially 
unjust practices” (2002, p. 4). 
Even though Habermas has largely abandoned the evolutionary philosophical 
grounding he developed in the 1970s, it is true that the idea of the Enlightenment still 
plays an important role in his thought. Allen (2016, p. 79) calls him out on this point, 
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arguing that the claim that this movement “represents a developmental advance over 
previous forms of life is doing a fair amount of justificatory, metanormative work” for 
Habermas. Insofar as this was the case, it would indeed be quite problematic and would 
raise the specter of Eurocentrism once more. 
It is true that Habermas has often described himself as “a defender of modernity” 
(Passerin d'Entrèves, 1996, p. 13) and of Enlightenment values. However, contra Allen, I 
do not think that his endorsement of modernity and the Enlightenment does much 
justificatory work for his argument. This is visible in the fact that Habermas does not cite 
the progress brought about by these historical movements in the past as a reason to 
ground his faith in future progress (as Honneth arguably does).  
Far from treating the Enlightenment as a historical achievement, Habermas instead 
speaks of it as “an unfinished project” (1996). In this sense Habermas treats the 
Enlightenment is a forward-looking ideal or “an imperative” whose values serve as an 
inspiration for emancipation in the future, not as a completed historical event that is 
supposed to ground the metanarrative of progress as a backward-looking “fact” (for 
more, see Outhwaite, 2018). Although he does endorse certain concrete historical 
changes that occurred in the past – such as “the transition from classical international law 
to what Kant saw as the ‘cosmopolitan condition’” (Habermas, 2006, p. 19) – these 
examples are domain-specific examples of what Allen calls “progress in history,” not 
broad, universal meta-narratives of “historical progress” that serve to justify his theory. 
I expand on this point when I turn to Habermas’s shift away from affirmative 
teleological philosophies of history towards the paradigm of collective memory as a 
source of critique. Before making to this argument, however, I first briefly address 
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Allen’s claim that Habermas’s theory relies on the problematic construction of a power-
free utopia. Although I contend that Habermas’s mature political theory does not rely on 
Eurocentric historical narratives to justify his faith in progress in a backward-looking 
manner, this still leaves Allen’s second critique open.  
At first glance Habermas’s vision of communication driven by the “unforced force 
of the better argument” may indeed rely on precisely the kind of power-free utopia that 
worries Allen. Habermas (1987a, pp. 323-4) admits that “the critique of validity claims 
carried out from the perspective of the participant cannot ultimately be separated 
from…the mixing of power claims and validity claims.” Allen (2008, pp. 135-6) takes 
advantage of this concession to question whether claims of power and validity can be 
separated at all. 
It may well be true that such a separation may not be possible either in practice or 
on a conceptual level. However, this does not mean that we cannot distinguish between 
better and worse arguments, i.e. between cases where the overlap between power and 
reason is lower or greater. It also does not mean that this ideal is illegitimate as standard 
of theoretical evaluation. Habermas is merely calling on those engaged in discourse to 
“question their motives, look at the genealogy of their beliefs, ask what interests their 
arguments serve” (Geuss, 1981, p. 26). In this sense, his work is in keeping with the 
immanent “ideology critique” (Ideologiekritik) of Adorno and the first generation of the 
Frankfurt School. Although the ideal of “popular discussion without domination” may be 
impossible to conceive of even in the abstract, it can still serve as part of an emancipatory 
social and political theory. Simone Chambers (1996, p. 207) points out that even if we 
can never fully overcome various forms of domination, “we must [still] find a way of 
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talking with each other as equals about the elimination of systemic inequality.” 
Despite his increasing reliance on a transcendental grounding for communicative 
action, the past still plays an important role in Habermas’s post-1990 political theory. 
However, insofar as he does look for evidence of empirical learning processes, this 
search is limited to discrete domains of social and political life and is decidedly non-
teleological. In his temporal vision, Habermas has moved from history to collective 
memory. Instead of relying on a fully-fledged philosophy of history, he therefore draws 
on catastrophic, shared memories of the past to call for change in the present. If I am 
right, then Habermas’s forward-looking, negativistic vision of history is actually fairly 
close to Allen’s account of “progress as a forward-looking moral or political imperative” 
(2016, p. 97). 
In contrast to Allen, I argue that Habermas and the first generation of the Frankfurt 
School share a common understanding of Europe’s age of total war as an important 
historical break. Although Habermas is a generation younger than his predecessors, he 
also attributes an epoch-forming significance to the experience of the Nazi regime. 
Surveying the physical, moral and political ruin of Germany in 1945 Habermas knew that 
his homeland would have to learn from this tragedy. Looking back on this crucial 
moment, he notes, “[T]he rhythm of my personal development intersected with the great 
historical events of the time” (Habermas, 1992, p. 77). 
As a result of these experiences, Habermas has reflected extensively on the 
possibilities for social learning that are contained within “Benjaminian moments” 
(Benhabib, 2012) of rupture. Using his terminology, rupture can be understood an 
experience that disrupts the “more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background 
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conditions” (Habermas, 1984/1987, p. I.70) that underlie the unthematized lifeworlds 
(Lebenswelten) of individuals within linguistic and cultural communities. By breaking up 
existing narratives of progress, these moments allow novel ideas to come to the surface. 
Such experiences of rupture – Habermas often adopts the idiom of a “caesura” 
(Zäsur) – play an important role in his understanding of history. Far from relying on 
progress, Habermas (2001b, pp. 26-37) writes that after the experience of the Second 
World War individuals and communities have to “learn from catastrophe.” This shift 
from progress to learning has real political – as well as philosophical – implications. He 
argues that after the horrors of National Socialism, German “patriotism cannot hide the 
fact that in Germany democracy has taken root in the motives and hearts of the 
citizens…after Auschwitz – and in a way only through the shock of the moral 
catastrophe” (Habermas, 1990b, p. 152). This postwar experience shows that identity can 
be reformed and rebuilt by reflecting on “the better traditions of our history, a history that 
is not unexamined but instead appropriated critically” (Habermas, 1989a, p. 234). This 
kind of learning from disaster requires full engagement with the tragedies and traumas of 
the past, not silencing or repression. 
The desire to learn from history while avoiding the pitfalls of the organic 
conceptions of history and peoplehood propagated by the Nazi regime is what leads 
Habermas to seek an “active remembrance – working through [aufarbeiten] the past and 
hoping for a better future” (in Matuštík, 2001, p. 10). In making this point, Habermas 
explicitly echoes Adorno by adopting the language of die Aufarbeitung der 
Vergangenheit. Like his mentor, he (2008b, p. 18) argues, “After the revelations 
concerning Auschwitz, nothing could be taken at face value.” By thematizing institutions 
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and traditions that had previously been taken for granted the past can help to expand 
social perceptions of what it is possible to achieve. 
As an imperative, Habermas argues that these caesurae not only reengage the 
cognitive capacity for enlarged thought; they also provide important motivational impetus 
for the transformation of communal life. For instance, he notes that critical theory’s 
interest in the trajectory of postwar Europe was “spurred by…[a] concern with the past.” 
This anxiety draws on the emotional “the fear of a political relapse.” For Habermas 
(2008b, pp. 17, 21) – as for many of his predecessors in Frankfurt – the memory of the 
Nazism thus serves a “negative point of reference” that expanded their cognitive 
capacities and motivated them to pursue change.  
Habermas’s commitment to grounding normativity within the paradigm of memory 
also helps to clarify his calls for Germans – and postwar democrats more broadly – to 
abandon classical nationalism in favor of “constitutional patriotism” 
(Verfassungspatriotismus). Although this form of belonging, which seeks to ground pride 
in one’s homeland in a felt commitment to the rational procedures of the democratic 
state, is often criticized for being too formalistic and empty of content, it actually does 
not assume that all national differences and allegiances will disappear into a homogenous 
global “postnational identity.”
6
 Far from being empty or abstract, the “passionate 
rationality” (Sternberger) of a truly constitutional patriotism is rooted in the particular 
historical experiences of different peoples, who have to reflect upon and critically “filter” 
their traditions through the negative reference points of their past communal crimes 
(Auschwitz in the German case, slavery in the American, etc.). Building on both Adorno 
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and Benjamin, Habermas argues that this form of collective Aufarbeitung der 
Vergangenheit aims to do justice to the dead through remembrance and a “consciousness 
of atonement” (Sühnebewußtsein). As a result, constitutional patriotism binds specific 
communities together through their “anamnestic solidarity” – i.e., through their collective 
task of remembering the dead and ensuring that they do not repeat their past crimes – not 
through pre-political characteristics like birth, nationality or ethnicity.
7
 
The practical-political implications of using memory in this way can also be seen in 
the “Historians Debate” (Historikerstreit) of the mid-1980s. In this controversy, 
Habermas sought to preserve the critical potential of 1945 as defining moment in German 
history. He objected to the political implications of the attempts of conservative 
historians to normalize the Nazi past, fearing that attempts to “bring the curtain down on 
the past” by subsuming the crimes of the Third Reich into a narrative of the violent 
twentieth century would allow the ideas that had led to these crimes to resurface, thus 
also inhibiting social critique in the future. He (Habermas, 1989a, p. 193) therefore 
argues that Germans must maintain their critical perspective towards the past by 
“maintaining a clear awareness of a break [Bruch] with our more sinister traditions.” 
Habermas argues that the memories of Europe’s age of total war have further 
political implications, most notably for the development of the European Union (EU). 
From its beginnings in the 1950s, the European project has built on the desire to secure 
peace in Europe after the horrors of World War II and the divisions wrought by the Cold 
War. Habermas (2005, p. 12) has sought to use the negativistic memories of a “bellicose 
past [that] entangled all European nations in bloody conflicts” to justify the development 
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of the EU as a postnational political community. He argues that instead of building on 
national differences, a common European identity can be formed by learning the 
importance of respecting human rights, abiding by the rule of law and refraining from 
violence from past mistakes that were made on the continent (see Verovšek, 2012). 
It is certainly possible to contest this interpretation of the legacy of World War II 
and the Holocaust in Europe. In his “Discourse on Colonialism,” Aimé Césaire (1972, p. 
3) argues that blaming Nazism for European barbarism is a mistake, since “before they 
were its victims, [Europeans] were its accomplices…they tolerated that Nazism before it 
was inflicted on them.” Given Habermas’s emphasis on the centrality of the Holocaust 
for German memory and intellectual culture, he would agree with this claim.  
Habermas would disagree, however, with Césaire when he argues, “Whether one 
likes it or not, at the end of the blind alley that is Europe, I mean the Europe of Adenauer, 
Schuman, Bidault and a few others, there is Hitler.” Habermas has no desire to 
whitewash the crimes of colonialism or the fact that Nazism had its roots in the barbarism 
that before the Second World War “had been applied only to non-European peoples” 
(Césaire, 1972, p. 3). However, despite its problems, he sees the European project as an 
attempt – inadequate though it may be – to come to terms with Europe’s historical legacy. 
Reflecting back on “the experience of 1945 and after,” Habermas (1992, p. 126) notes 
that in addition to his rejection of nationalism and violence, he retained something else, 
“namely that things got better. Things really got rather better. One must use that as a 
starting-point too.”  
Although this admission is backward-looking in a sense, it does not look to the past 
in a triumphalist, teleological manner. Instead, he wants to use it as the foundation for 
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progress as a forward-looking imperative for change. Although Habermas does not often 
address Europe’s need to atone for its crimes of empire beyond the continent directly, he 
argues that the understanding of history given by a focus on collective memory gives 
Europeans the “chance to assume a reflexive distance from themselves” which – 
combined with “the growing distance of imperial domination and the history of 
colonialism” – should allow them to “learn from the perspective of the defeated 
to…support the rejection of Eurocentrism” (Habermas & Derrida, 2003, p. 297).  
Taken to its logical conclusion, his argument about the politics of memory suggests 
that Germany ought to show the same commitment to remembrance for its mass killings 
of the Herero people of Namibia (Anderson, 2005) – which it only acknowledged in 2016 
(Brady, 2016) – as it has to the Nazi genocide during World War II.
8
 Although he should 
do more to draw out the implications of his position beyond the crimes committed on the 
European continent, Habermas’s mature notion collective memory conceives of the past 
as a process of moral-practical learning from catastrophe that is does not rely on 
narratives of progress, but instead creates imperatives for the future (for more on this 
critique of Habermas’s understanding of collective memory and its relationship to 
Europe, see Verovšek, Forthcoming). Far from the backward-looking, teleological 
philosophies of “historical progress” posited by Kant, Hegel, and Marx, I have shown 
that Habermas’s mnemonic conception of the past is far more similar to what Allen calls 
“progress in history.” 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks and Implications 
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In this argument I have defended Habermas from the accusation that his work is 
based on overly utopian visions of the future that build on “backward-looking,” 
Eurocentric notions of historical progress. Although his work in the 1970s did indeed 
build on the theories of childhood development put forward by Piaget and Kohlberg in a 
problematic manner, his more recent writings have moved away from this reliance on 
stadial philosophies of history to motivate his utopian faith in progress. While 
Habermas’s political theory and his “short political writings” still draw on the past, 
Habermas (and critical theory more generally) has moved from the paradigm of history to 
that of collective memory. As a result of this shift, his notion of temporal “learning-
processes” is decidedly negativistic and non-utopian.  
While her argument may well apply to Honneth and Forst, I think that Allen errs in 
attributing it to Habermas, as well as to contemporary critical theory as a whole.
9
 Far 
from relying on problematic philosophies of history, I argue that Habermas’s emphasis 
on the ability of collective memory and rupture to further social criticism by thematizing 
aspects of social life that had previously been taken for granted resonates with important 
points made by postcolonial scholarship. For example, Chakrabarty (2000, 45) makes a 
similar argument in pointing out that engaging critically with the historical ideas that 
legitimize the modern Western state and its “attendant institutions” actually forces 
political theory to return to “categories whose global currency can no longer be taken for 
granted.” On my interpretation, therefore, Habermas’s work should not be seen only in 
opposition to postcolonial thinking, but also as a potential complement to it. 
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Much like the first generation of the Frankfurt School, I argue that Habermas has 
drawn on the negative memories of Europe’s age of total war to help justify his faith in 
progress “as an imperative” or a “forward-looking” task for politics in the present. In this 
sense, his understanding of the past and the meaning of utopian thinking are closer to his 
predecessors in the first generation of the Frankfurt School than most scholars are 
prepared to recognize. There are many reasons why this similarity is overlooked, but the 
issue of methodology is particularly important. The more fragmentary, aphoristic forms 
of critical theory adopted by Foucault, Adorno, Benjamin and the rest of the founders of 
critical theory certainly make their rejection of all narratives of historical progress more 
immediately obvious than Habermas’s more systematic approach.
10
  
In Isaiah Berlin’s (1953) terms, the systematic Habermas is clearly a hedgehog. By 
contrast, many of his colleagues in the first generation are more fox-like in their focus on 
philosophical blind-spots and constellations of ideas, rather than grand narratives and 
unified theories. However, this difference in intellectual disposition should not mask the 
similarity of the conclusions drawn by these thinkers. Despite their differences in 
philosophical approach, from a methodological point of view what is important is that all 
of these thinkers reject stadial philosophies of history, approaching the past through the 
paradigm of collective memory instead. 
A greater understanding of the role that memory and rupture play within critical 
theory as a whole also has the potential to address some of the broader concerns raised 
not only by Allen, but by postcolonial theory as a whole. Said (1993, p. 278) is right to 
point out that critiques the Frankfurt School “is stunningly silent on racist theory, anti-
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imperialist resistance, and oppositional practice in the empire.” However, on my reading 
this is more a sin of omission that of commission. Habermas and his colleagues in the 
first generation of the Frankfurt School have indeed focused too much and too 
exclusively on the Holocaust and the crimes committed by Europeans against other 
Europeans on the European continent.  
To a certain extent this somewhat parochial emphasis on Europe is understandable, 
given that their move from philosophy of history to the paradigm of collective memory 
was motivated in large part by their experience and the remembrance of total war. Insofar 
as collective memory builds on “a felt knowledge of recent events” (Kateb, 1998, p. viii) 
created by formative, “authentic experiences” in the life of the individual (see both 
Benjamin, 1977a, p. 159; Gadamer, 2004, p. 86), there is a certain logic to the idea that 
Europeans would focus first and foremost on traumatic events and atrocities that they 
themselves experienced. Such a perspective is also in line with the Frankfurt School’s 
emphasis on “lived experience” (Adorno quoted in Strydom, 2013, p. 154), which both 
provides the critical theorist with the impetus for critique and “objectively afford[s] 
contemporaries privileged access to the structures of the social world” (Habermas, 
1984/1987, p. II.403). 
However, despite their coherence, these considerations should not let Habermas 
and the rest of the Frankfurt School off the hook for overlooking the European legacy of 
racism, imperialism and colonialism. Said and Allen are both right to call critical theory 
out on this point. However, if my argument about crucial role that memory and a 
conception of progress “as an imperative” play in critical theory is correct, the insights 
Adorno, Habermas and others have drawn from the Holocaust can and should help 
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Europe and Europeans to recognize and acknowledge their colonial crimes by applying 
the model of “learning from catastrophe” (2001b, pp. 26-37) that emphasizes 
“anamnestic solidarity” (see Pensky, 1989) with the victims in their erstwhile colonies, 
i.e. with the dead who “are really slain” (Horkheimer quoted in Benjamin, 1999, p. 471). 
Extending the insights drawn from collective remembrance of the Holocaust to 
Europe’s broader colonial project – as well as the role that Enlightenment thinking and 
European philosophy played in furthering this imperial domination (McCarthy, 2009) – 
will require a significant amount of work. However, there are substantive points of 
contact within recent scholarship that should help this process along. For example, 
Timothy Snyder (2018, pp. 75, 74) has argued that over the course of “the Second World 
War, Europeans applied colonial principles to one another” in the sense that “imperial 
power does not recognize the political entities that it encounters…and so it destroys or 
subverts them while claiming that they never existed.” Insofar as Germany can recognize 
the atrocities it committed in East-Central Europe as colonial crimes, it might help the 
Federal Republic and Europe as a whole to acknowledge their colonial atrocities beyond 
Europe as well. Just as the Frankfurt School played an important role in shaping postwar 
memory in Germany and Europe through public interventions by Adorno and Habermas, 
it is the task of contemporary critical theory to build on these commitments and extend 
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